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OPEN DOORWAY ARRESTS: HAS MCCLISH V.
NUGENT TRULY CHANGED THE ANALYSIS?
At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion1. . .[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Local police have probable cause to believe John Smith has been
distributing illegal firearms from his residence. Smith has not been
living in the area long and has been operating out of a rented apartment.
The police believe Smith may know that his activities have gained their
attention, and three officers quickly make their way to Smith’s apartment
to arrest him without a warrant. Although the officers would normally
obtain a warrant to make this type of felony arrest, they are fearful that
Smith may leave the area before he can be apprehended.
After the police locate Smith’s apartment, they approach the
doorway. Smith’s apartment does not have a common area at its
entrance, and nothing separates the officers from the interior of Smith’s
apartment except for a closed front door. One officer knocks on the
door, but the officers do not announce their presence outside of the
apartment. Responding to the knock, Smith opens the door to the
officers and proceeds to remain standing near the doorway of his
apartment. Can the police arrest him in this situation?3
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures has led to the development of several important rules
regarding arrest.4 First, a warrantless arrest of an individual, conducted
in a public place, is valid as long as the arrest is supported by probable
cause.5 Second, police are required to obtain a warrant in order to arrest
an individual who remains within the privacy of his or her own home.6

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
3
This hypothetical is loosely based on typical warrantless doorway arrest scenarios that
are examined throughout this Note.
4
See infra Part II.A (discussing the constitutionality of warrantless arrests in public
places, in the doorway of the home, and within the privacy of the home).
5
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1976).
6
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits police from making an entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine
felony arrest if a warrant has not been obtained and the suspect has not given consent for
the police to enter).
1
2
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Subject to only a few exceptions,7 police officers are not allowed to
physically pass through the threshold of a doorway to conduct an arrest
within the home absent a warrant, even if probable cause exists.8 This
Note addresses whether the warrant requirement applies if police intend
to arrest an individual who voluntarily opens his or her door in response
to a knock by the police and remains standing in the threshold of the
doorway: not quite within the privacy of the home, but not standing
fully outside of the open doorway either.
A majority of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals hold that
warrantless open doorway arrests conducted under these particular
circumstances are presumptively legal.9 Although these circuits have
rejected the legality of open doorway arrests in certain instances, this
does not amount to an outright rejection of the principle at hand.10
While various authors contend that judicial decisions on warrantless
doorway arrests are inconsistent,11 it was not until the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s recent outlier decision in McClish v.
Nugent in 2007 that a circuit split actually existed on this particular
issue.12
This Note takes the position that warrantless open doorway arrests
are valid under the Fourth Amendment and are consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.13 Part II of this Note explains the constitutionality of
Id. at 588–89 (noting that an arrest within the home involves an invasion of the
sanctity of the home, and a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent exigent
circumstances such as consent, is too substantial an invasion of privacy to be allowed even
when probable cause exists).
8
Id. at 589–90 (explaining that an arrest within the home is plainly subject to the
warrant requirement and the existence of probable cause, alone, is insufficient to validate
the arrest).
9
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have upheld
warrantless open doorway arrests as constitutionally valid under the Fourth Amendment).
10
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have declined to
uphold warrantless doorway arrests based on the fact that police fully penetrated the
privacy of the home or used coercive tactics to gain entry to the home).
11
See Jennifer Marino, Note, Does Payton Apply: Absent Consent or Exigent Circumstance,
Are Warrantless, In-Home Police Seizures and Arrests of Persons Seen Through an Open Door of
the Home Legal?, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 569, 579–87 (2005) (arguing that the circuits have
interpreted and applied the requirements of Payton differently, and the fact that different
results have been reached in factually distinguishable cases has caused a circuit split on the
issue of warrantless open doorway arrests); Evan B. Citron, Note, Say Hello and Wave
Goodbye: The Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2761, 2786 (2006) (contending that two conflicting views, referred to as the “voluntary
exposure view” and ‘“sanctity’ view[,]” have been adopted by the circuits in an attempt to
resolve the dispute over the constitutionality of warrantless open doorway arrests).
12
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a warrantless open
doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into the private confines of the home that violates the
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton).
13
See infra Parts III.A–B.
7
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warrantless arrests conducted in public areas and explores decisions by
the United States Courts of Appeals involving open doorway arrests.14
Part III analyzes factors courts have emphasized in upholding and
invalidating warrantless doorway arrests, argues that courts have
consistently applied Supreme Court precedent in evaluating the validity
of these arrests, and concludes that the decision of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in McClish represents a confused interpretation of the
key aspects that must be examined in a warrantless doorway arrest
case.15 Finally, Part IV proposes a standard of model reasoning that
should be applied to resolve future cases involving warrantless doorway
arrests based upon Fourth Amendment principles, United States
Supreme Court precedent, and the decisions of the circuit courts
examined throughout this Note.16
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment affords general protection to individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures, but its protections are not
absolute and can be surrendered.17 First, Part II.A outlines a general
explanation of Fourth Amendment principles related to warrantless
arrests conducted in public areas and explains the significance of United
States v. Watson, a pivotal Supreme Court decision upholding the validity
of such arrests.18 Second, Part II.A discusses the Supreme Court
decisions of United States v. Santana and Payton v. New York, that together
establish the legal scope of warrantless open doorway arrests.19 Part II.B
then explains how the circuit courts have interpreted and applied the
principles of Santana and Payton to resolve open doorway arrest cases.20
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
U.S. CONST. amend. IV states the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
By these explicit terms, the Fourth Amendment affords individuals only a right, rather than
a guarantee, of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.
18
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the protections offered to individuals by the Fourth
Amendment and the general principle that probable cause, alone, is sufficient to support an
arrest carried out in a public area); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
19
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)); infra Part
II.A.3 (discussing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
20
See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing cases in which various circuit courts have both
upheld and invalidated warrantless doorway arrests).
14
15
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Finally, Part II.C discusses McClish v. Nugent, a controversial decision
which caused a circuit split regarding the validity of warrantless open
doorway arrests.21
A. The Fourth Amendment and Its Application To Arrest
The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of individuals to remain
secure in their persons and homes against unreasonable searches and
seizures.22 The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment stems
from eighteenth-century concerns over the prevalence of arbitrary
searches and seizures of property.23 More recently, however, the
protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment has been
interpreted to apply primarily to the individual.24 While the Supreme
See infra Part II.C; see also McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007).
See supra note 17 (quoting the text of the Fourth Amendment); see also WAYNE W.
GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 7 (2003) (explaining that seizure of a person has been defined
both as “police use of actual force [which] achieves a restraining effect on a suspect,” and
as a ‘“show of force’ . . . [coupled with] an actual submission by the suspect[]”).
23
See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security, 33 WAKE. FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
was a creature of eighteenth-century concern for the protection of property rights against
arbitrary and general searches and seizures) (citing Edward L. Barrett Jr., Personal Rights,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 60 (1960)) (tracing the
developments that resulted in interpreting the Fourth Amendment to afford greater
protection to property rights than to personal liberty); see also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 617, 626–30 (1886) (reviewing the historical purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
24
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places); see also Sean M. Lewis, The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway:
Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of
Their Apartment Buildings?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 273, 275 n.11 (2002) (explaining that the
protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is
aimed at the protection of the individual) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351); see also Stephen
Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914 (1997). Jones argues that the Supreme
Court “made it clear in Katz that the ‘person’ provided for in the text of the Fourth
Amendment extended beyond the physical body. The Fourth Amendment ‘person’
included peoples’ expectations that their activity will remain private.” Id. Jones explains
that Justice Black framed this debate in his dissenting opinion in Katz:
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the
Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court
began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a
law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an
individual's privacy. By clever word juggling the Court finds it
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and
seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect
privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that
can neither be searched nor seized. Few things happen to an
individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another . . . . The
21
22
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Court has not created an absolute rule requiring police to obtain a
warrant in order to make an arrest, the Court has expressed a preference
that such warrants should be obtained if possible.25 However, a mere
preference for obtaining arrest warrants does not require a court to
invalidate an arrest simply because the police did not, or were not able
to, obtain a warrant.26 The central issue that must be examined in cases
dealing with a Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless arrests is
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy of the individual has been
violated.27 After first upholding the constitutionality of warrantless
Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and
effects.” No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give
this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything
which affects privacy.
Id. at 914–15 n.22. (Black, J., dissenting).
25
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (holding that the informed
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what types of searches
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution is preferred over the actions of law
enforcement officers making arrests); see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106
(1965) (stating that the informed decisions of magistrates empowered to issue warrants is
preferred over the hurried actions of officers who may make arrests); United States v. Leon,
486 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984) (explaining that the Court has expressed a strong preference for
warrants to be obtained as a reliable safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment).
26
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). The Court explicitly lent support for
this principle in Watson:
Congress has plainly decided against conditioning warrantless arrest
power on proof of exigent circumstances. Law enforcement officers
may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where practicable to do so, and
their judgments about probable cause may be more readily accepted
where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. But we decline to
transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the
judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize
warrantless public arrests [based] on probable cause rather than to
encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to
the existence of exigent circumstances[] . . .
Id. at 423–24 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted); see also GREENHALGH, supra note 22, at
18 (explaining that warrantless arrests are reasonable “because that is the way it has always
been done[]”).
27
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that each individual has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment). In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan expressed the idea that the
Fourth Amendment set forth a twofold requirement in determining what type of protection
should be afforded to individuals. Id. at 361. Harlan explained “first that a person [must]
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id.; see also
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (explaining that the Court in Katz held that the
capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the
individual who claims such protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
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public arrests in United States v. Watson, the Court later expanded upon
this principle and further refined the parameters of warrantless arrests in
two landmark cases, Santana and Payton.28
1.

Warrantless Arrests and United States v. Watson

In United States v. Watson, the Supreme Court held that warrantless
felony arrests made in a public place and based on probable cause are
valid.29 In its opinion, the Court emphasized the fact that the existence of
probable cause surrounding an arrest strongly supports the validity of
such an arrest, even if a warrant has not been obtained.30 The principles
invaded area); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (explaining that the capacity to
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether an individual who
claims the protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy). See also Jones, supra note 24,
at 908. Jones explains that “[t]he concept of ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ is at the
forefront of all Fourth Amendment analysis. . . . If a defendant does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an area searched or an item seized [(including a person)], he does
not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 908. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1 (2007) (analyzing the Katz expectation of privacy test).
28
See infra Part II.A.1, Part II.A.2, and Part II.A.3 (discussing Watson, Santana, and
Payton, respectively).
29
Watson, 423 U.S. at 416–24. In Watson, police armed with probable cause but no
warrant arrested Watson in a public restaurant for possession of stolen credit cards. Id. at
412–13. The Court held that Watson’s warrantless arrest was valid and did not violate his
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 424. In its opinion, the Court first based its holding on
the fact that “[t]he cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor or felony . . . if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.” Id. at 418
(citations omitted). The Court next determined that “[t]he balance struck by the common
law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without a warrant, has
survived substantially intact. It appears in almost all of the States in the form of express
statutory authorization.” Id. at 421–22. Finally, the Court expressed its belief that the
preceding principles indicated that “Congress has plainly decided against conditioning
warrantless arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances.” Id. at 423 (footnote omitted).
30
Id. at 416–18. The Court explained that certain law enforcement officers have been
statutorily authorized to make felony arrests based upon probable cause but without
warrants for many years. Id. at 416. The Court then reasoned that there was no existing
precedent indicating that a warrant was required to make a valid arrest for a felony under
the Fourth Amendment; its prior decisions were actually uniformly against this principle.
Id. at 416–17. Most importantly, the Court concluded that the necessary inquiry in these
types of cases dealing with public arrest “was not whether there was a warrant or whether
there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause for the arrest.” Id. at 417;
see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (noting that the Court has never
invalidated an arrest that was supported by probable cause based solely on the fact that the
police officers failed to secure a warrant); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963)
(opinion of Clark, J.) (explaining that the lawfulness of an arrest without a warrant must be
based upon probable cause); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (stating that the
crucial question in this case was whether there was probable cause for the arrest; if there
was, the arrest although it was without a warrant, was lawful); OTIS H. STEPHENS &
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supporting warrantless public arrests articulated by the Court in Watson
have been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and consistently applied by
the circuit courts.31 After Watson, it was not entirely clear how far its
holding could be extended and whether the warrant requirement would
apply if the individual the police sought to arrest was standing in plain
view in an open doorway; the Court had an opportunity to resolve these
questions in United States v. Santana.32
2.

Warrantless Public Arrests and United States v. Santana

In Santana, the Supreme Court extended the principles of Watson to
apply to doorway arrests, holding that the defendant’s warrantless arrest
was valid because she knowingly exposed herself to police officers at the

RICHARD A. GLENN, UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER
LAW 294 (2006) (stating that “[a]n officer’s on-the-scene determination of probable
cause provides the legal justification both for the arrest and the subsequent brief detention
necessary to take the administrative steps incident to the arrest[]”).
31
See United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that a warrantless
arrest by a law enforcement officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in
situations where the arrest is in a public place and there is probable cause for the arrest);
United States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that it is wellestablished that there is nothing in prior cases indicating that the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant for a valid felony arrest to be effectuated); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 362 (2001) (holding that based upon Watson, the existence of probable cause is
a sufficient condition for arrest); Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 992 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the Court has never elevated its judicial preference for arrest warrants to
the level of a per se rule that mandates warrants for all arrests regardless of the existence of
probable cause); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 216–17 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that an
officer may conduct a warrantless arrest so long as probable cause exists to believe that the
suspect committed a crime); United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Watson, 423 U.S. at 421–24) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is not violated
by a warrantless felony arrest carried out in a public place); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S.
14, 18 (1990) (stating that it has long been settled that a warrantless arrest in a public place
is permissible as long as the arresting officer has probable cause); Crane v. State of Texas,
759 F.2d 412, 424 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Watson, 423 U.S. at 416–17) (noting that “there is
nothing in the Court’s prior cases indicating that under the Fourth Amendment a warrant
is required to make a valid arrest for a felony[]”); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 366 (3d
Cir. 1981) (stating that it is clear that an arrest may be effected in a public place without a
warrant); United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 580 (1980) (stating that under Watson,
personal seizure alone does not require a warrant); United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297,
1299 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that a warrantless arrest in a public place does not constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412, 419 (10th Cir. 1979)
(upholding the validity of a warrantless arrest made in a public place if carried out by a
police officer armed with probable cause); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 419 (2d Cir.
1978) (explaining that Watson was the first square holding to permit a law enforcement
officer to make a warrantless arrest in a public place after developing probable cause for
the arrest).
32
See infra Part II.A.2.
THE
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doorway of her home—which is a public place.33 In examining the
circumstances of the arrest, the Court explained that the first and most
important question to decide was whether Santana was present in a
public place at the time of the arrest.34 The Court determined that
because Santana had been standing at the doorway of her home when
she was arrested, “[s]he was not in an area where she had any
expectation of privacy.”35
The Court emphasized that Santana’s
warrantless arrest was valid because she had been standing in the
doorway of her home—a public place—and in doing so she voluntarily
exposed herself to public view before the police arrested her.36
The Santana decision stands for two important principles in the
context of warrantless doorway arrests: first, consistent with Watson,

33
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). In Santana, the police had received
information that Dominga Santana was involved in a drug purchase with an undercover
agent. Id. at 39–40. The police, with probable cause, approached Santana’s house and
observed her standing in the open doorway of her home. Id. at 40. Santana saw the police
and attempted to run into her home to escape from the officers, and the officers followed
her through the open doorway and caught her in the vestibule of her home. Id. The Court
held that Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid because she had knowingly exposed
herself to police officers in the doorway of her home, which is a public place. Id. at 42.
34
Id. According to the Court, Santana was standing directly in the doorway when the
police arrived; one step forward would have put her outside the home, and one step
backward would have put her inside her home. Id. at 40 n.1. In distinguishing between
public and private areas in relation to the home, the Court explained that “[w]hile it may be
true that under the common law of property the threshold of one’s dwelling is ‘private,’ as
is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting
the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a ‘public’ place.” Id. at 42; see also 5 AM. JUR. 2d
Arrest § 97 (2007) (explaining that the doorway is considered to be a public place for
purposes of warrantless arrest).
35
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. The Court explained that based on the fact that Santana was
standing in an open doorway, which is a public place, “[s]he was not merely visible to the
public[,] but was exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been
standing completely outside her house.” Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59
(1924) (stating that “the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields[]”)).
The Court then explained that because Santana had knowingly exposed herself to the
public in this manner, she could not claim a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy. Id.
(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection[]”)). The Court stated that based upon both of these factors,
Santana had not been “in an area where she had any [reasonable] expectation of privacy.”
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. Therefore, the Court concluded that Santana’s arrest was
constitutionally valid because the police, in making the arrest, “merely intended to perform
a function which [the Court had] approved [of] in Watson.” Id. at 42.
36
Id. The Court explained that because Defendant Santana was knowingly standing in
the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an area in
which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
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when a person stands in the doorway of his or her home, that person will
be deemed to be in a public place for purposes of arrest.37 Second, as
long as probable cause exists for such an arrest to be made, the arrest
cannot be deemed invalid because a person knowingly standing in a
public place has surrendered any expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.38 Even after Santana, however, the scope of
warrantless doorway arrests did not become entirely clear until the
Supreme Court decided Payton v. New York four years later.
3.

Warrantless Private Arrests and Payton v. New York

In Payton, the Court limited the scope of its holding in Santana by
invalidating warrantless arrests that occurred beyond the threshold of
the open doorway of the home.39 The Payton decision was based upon
the Court’s examination of two related cases, both of which addressed
the legality of arrests carried out after police made actual entries into the
privacy of the home.40 Based upon both sets of facts, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a
warrantless and non-consensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to
make a routine felony arrest.41
The Court stressed that in both cases the police made their seizures
after walking through the doorway and into the physical vicinity of the
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
39
United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house, and, absent exigent circumstances, the
threshold of the doorway may not reasonably be crossed to make an arrest unless a
warrant has first been obtained).
40
Id. at 574. In the first case, Payton v. New York, the police had gathered evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant Payton for his connection with a
recent murder. Id. at 576. The police had not obtained a warrant and went to Payton’s
apartment intending to arrest him. Id. Payton did not respond to repeated knocks on the
door and the police proceeded to use crowbars to break open the door and enter the
vicinity of the apartment. Id. Although Payton was not present at the apartment, the
police seized a shotgun casing that was later used at Payton’s murder trial. Id. at 576–77.
In the second case, Riddick v. New York, police went to the apartment of defendant Riddick
to arrest him for armed robbery though they had not first obtained a warrant. Id. at 578.
The police knocked on the door of Riddick’s home in mid-day, and Riddick’s son answered
the door. Id. Through the open doorway of the home, the police were able to see Riddick
sitting in a bed covered by a sheet. Id. The police subsequently entered Riddick’s
apartment and placed him under arrest. Id.
41
Id. at 576. In its conclusion, the Court relied on a basic reading of the text of the
Fourth Amendment, stating that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
Id. at 586. The Court then ultimately held that a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent
exigent circumstances such as consent, is an unlawful invasion of an individual’s right to
privacy that cannot be allowed even when probable cause exists. Id. at 588–89.
37
38
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defendant’s home, an obvious infringement past the threshold of the
doorway.42 In addition, the warrantless arrests made in Payton fell
beyond the scope of the types of arrests that had been previously upheld
in Watson.43 These factors led the Court to ultimately conclude that a
warrantless entry into the privacy of the home is presumptively
unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.44
In sum, Santana holds that a doorway is a public place and that an
individual knowingly and voluntarily standing in such an area has no
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.45
Payton establishes the doorway as the threshold that distinguishes the
public from the private area of the home, and holds that an individual
who remains firmly within his home cannot be lawfully arrested without
a warrant, absent exigent circumstances.46 By remaining within one’s
Id. at 589. The Court explained that while the Fourth Amendment protects the
privacy of an individual in a wide variety of settings, the zone of its protection is most
clearly defined by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home. Id. The
Court found strong support for this principle in its textual interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, stating that “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.” Id. at 589–90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
43
Payton, 445 U.S. at 598–99. The Court stated that while its decision in Watson
regarding the validity of a public arrest “was supported by cases directly in point and by
the unanimous views of the commentators,” it had not located any “direct authority
supporting forcible entries into a home to make a routine arrest” nor had it found any
scholarly opinions supporting this view. Id. at 598.
44
Id. at 590. The Court held that “[i]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property
and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant.” Id.
45
See supra note 36 (explaining that because the defendant Santana was knowingly
standing in the doorway of her home, which is considered a public place, she was not in an
area in which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment).
46
See supra note 44 (explaining the Court’s holding in Payton). The term exigent
circumstances has been defined as “[a] situation in which a police officer must take
immediate action to effectively make an arrest, search, or seizure for which probable cause
exists, and thus may do so without first obtaining a warrant.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
260 (8th ed. 2004); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that
exigent circumstances combined with probable cause may excuse police officers from
complying with the warrant requirement) (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33
(1925)); McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing, as examples of
exigent circumstances, cases involving the pursuit of a fleeing suspect, putting out a fire in
a burning building, breaking up a violent fight, or attending to the victim of a stabbing).
Notably, however, a clear definition of exigent circumstances was absent from the Court’s
opinion in Payton. See also Warrantless Entry to Arrest in Suspect’s Home: Payton v. New York,
94 HARV. L. REV. 178, 185–86 (1980) (explaining that a flaw in the Payton decision is that the
Court failed to define exigent circumstances, and because exigent circumstances can mean
different things to different people, Payton should be read as allowing warrantless arrests
42
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home, which is clearly beyond the threshold of the doorway, an
individual retains an expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment that cannot be infringed upon.47
B. Decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals Regarding Warrantless
Open Doorway Arrests
1.

Major Decisions Upholding Warrantless Open Doorway Arrests

Almost all of the circuits have addressed the issue of warrantless
open doorway arrests since Santana and Payton.48 Specific decisions of
the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals tend to provide the
most direct support for the constitutional validity of such arrests.49
Cases decided by other Courts of Appeals also lend support to the
notion that warrantless doorway arrests are generally upheld.50 To
only in situations “that police reasonably believe must be made immediately to avert loss
of life, harm to the innocent, destruction of evidence, or flight of a suspect[]”).
47
Payton, 445 U.S. at 588–89 (explaining that an arrest within the home involves an
invasion of the sanctity of the home, and a warrantless arrest inside the home, absent
exigent circumstances such as consent, is too substantial an invasion of privacy to be
allowed even when probable cause exists); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (stating that each individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment).
48
See discussion infra Parts II.B.1–2.
49
See infra Part II.B.1.a (discussing United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir.
1987)); infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995));
infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996)).
50
See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that no individual
in a place open to public view can expect privacy in that place and at that time, whether he
is at the threshold of the doorway, in a vestibule of the home, or at the far end of an
exposed interior room). The Gori court noted that “[o]nce a door is voluntarily opened by
an occupant in response to a knock by someone invited by an occupant, the Fourth
Amendment's protection of the home is not abrogated so long as the officer's conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. The Gori court then stated that a person who
opens the door to a dwelling in response to a knock opens to view whatever can be seen by
the invitee, and those inside can no longer maintain any heightened expectation of privacy.
Id. The court finally explained that “[t]he idea that Santana turns on the defendant’s
location is, . . . ‘unsound from the standpoint of both principle and pragmatism[][.]’” Id.
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.1(e) at 256–57 (1996)); see also Knight
v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Payton does not prevent
police from telling a suspect to step outside his home and then arresting him without a
warrant because the officer never crosses “the firm line at the entrance to the house” in
effecting the arrest); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that courts have generally upheld arrests “where the police go to a person’s
home without a warrant, knock on the door, announce from outside the home the person is
under arrest when he opens the door to answer, and the person acquiesces to the arrest[]”);
Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that “it [is] unwise to become
preoccupied with the exact location of the individual in relation to the doorway. . . .
[Because] the crucial issues involve the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and
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highlight these principles, decisions of the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals are discussed next.
a.

United States v. Carrion

In Carrion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
defendant’s doorway arrest, which took place in the doorway of the
defendant’s hotel room after he voluntarily opened the door, was valid
and did not violate the warrant requirement implemented in Payton.51 In
its reasoning, the court relied heavily on its previous decision in United
States v. Mason.52 Notably, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
that the Mason opinion gave no exact specification of the Defendant
Mason’s location in the doorway at the time of his arrest.53 The court
concluded that based on its previous decision in Mason, the defendant’s
arrest in Carrion was valid under the Fourth Amendment.54 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has relied on Carrion in rendering subsequent
decisions involving similar instances of warrantless doorway arrests.55
whether that individual came to the doorway voluntarily[]”); McKinney v. George, 726
F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the police did not cross the threshold of
defendant’s apartment because after the defendant opened his door to their knock, the
police told him to come along with them and he voluntarily complied).
51
Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128. In Carrion, defendants Carrion and Solmor were involved in
a drug sale with undercover DEA officers. Id. at 1122–23. A purchase had been arranged
between Carrion and one of the agents, and Carrion was arrested after the transaction. Id.
at 1123. After Carrion’s arrest, the agents located Solmor in a hotel room. Id. One of the
agents identified himself to a hotel housekeeping employee and asked the housekeeper to
knock on the door of Solmor’s room to see if anyone was present. Id. The employee
knocked, stated he was housekeeping, and Solmor opened the door. Id. The agents drew
their weapons, and ordered Solmor to raise his hands. Id. Solmor then surrendered to the
police and was subsequently arrested although the DEA agents had not first obtained a
warrant. Id.
52
United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981). In Mason, the defendant
voluntarily came to the front door of his house as law enforcement agents approached. Id.
at 47. Although the agents did not have an arrest warrant, the court held that the
defendant’s arrest at his door was valid. Id. Citing Santana as controlling precedent, the
court explained that such a warrantless arrest was consistent with the Fourth Amendment
because Mason was in a public place at the time of arrest and thus had no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id.
53
Carrion, 809 F.2d at 1128 n.9 (stressing that “[b]y declining to require any such exact
showing [of the defendant’s exact location], the Mason Court, it seems clear, regarded
Mason’s location at the open front door as a public place even if his feet were planted
slightly back of the door frame[]”).
54
Id. at 1128 (stating that based upon the reasoning of Mason, Solmor’s arrest was valid
because he had no protected expectation of privacy while he stood in the doorway of the
hotel room and the arrest was effected before the DEA agents actually entered the hotel
room).
55
See Pulliam v. City of Hornlake, Mississippi, 1994 WL 442316, at *2 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that although the defendant was only at her door as a result of a knock from the
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United States v. Vaneaton

Similarly, in Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest, which occurred after the
defendant voluntarily opened his door to police officers standing outside
of his motel room, was proper under the Fourth Amendment because the
zone of privacy sought to be protected by Payton was not implicated.56
The court explained that the question in Vaneaton was not whether the
defendant was actually standing inside or outside of the threshold of his
motel room at the time of his arrest, “but whether he ‘voluntarily
exposed himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his
motel room to the police.”57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that because Vaneaton opened the door after he saw the
police, she was still in a public place and could be considered to be in a public place for
purposes of warrantless arrest, even if she was standing slightly back from the door frame);
United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1539 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because the
defendant responded voluntarily to a border patrol agent’s knock on the defendant’s motel
room door, no Fourth Amendment scrutiny was triggered regarding the subsequent
arrest); United States v. Bustamante-Saenz, 894 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
because the police did not enter the defendant’s home in order to arrest him, but instead
waited to arrest the defendant until he emerged from his house, his arrest did not violate
the Fourth Amendment).
56
United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995). In Vaneaton, the police
were investigating the activities of Jack Vaneaton, a burglar who had been operating in
various counties in Oregon. Id. at 1424. During their investigation of Vaneaton’s
possession of stolen property, the police learned that Vaneaton was staying in a nearby
motel for the night. Id. at 1425. Armed with probable cause, the police went to Vaneaton’s
hotel room seeking to arrest him for receiving stolen property. Id. The police knocked on
Vaneaton’s door but made no demands of Vaneaton to open the door. Id. Vaneaton
opened the curtains of a window, saw that the police were outside, and proceeded to open
the doorway of his room. Id. As Vaneaton stood at the doorway, but was just inside the
threshold of the room, the police advised Vaneaton that he was under arrest. Id.
Significantly, the police did not enter past the threshold of the doorway before advising
Vaneaton that he was under arrest. Id. See also supra note 44 (explaining that in Payton, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house
that may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant).
57
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1426. The court explained that the question presented in Vaneaton
was not based only upon whether the defendant was standing inside or outside of the
threshold of the doorway, but rather “whether [Vaneaton had] ‘voluntarily exposed
himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely opening the door of his motel room to the police. If
[Vaneaton had] exposed himself [in this manner], the presumption created by Payton is
overcome.” Id. (citation omitted). In formulating this principle, the Vaneaton court relied
heavily on the reasoning of a previous, related decision. Id. (citing United States v.
Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980)). In Johnson, the suspect’s warrantless open doorway
arrest had been held invalid because the arresting officers had used coercive tactics and
misrepresented their identities in order to force the suspect to open his door. Johnson, 626
F.2d at 757. The Johnson court explained, “it cannot be said that Johnson voluntarily
exposed himself to warrantless arrest by opening his door to agents who misrepresented
their identities[]” because Johnson’s exposure was not consensual on his part. Id.
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police through a window, he exposed himself to warrantless arrest in a
public place and his arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.58
Though it was not the first case decided by the Ninth Circuit on this
issue, the position articulated by the court in Vaneaton represents the
general position of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on warrantless
open doorway arrests.59

58
Vaneaton, 49 F.3d at 1427. The court explained that “implicit in Johnson is [the]
approval of the warrantless arrest of a suspect who voluntarily opens the door of his
dwelling in response to a noncoercive knock by the police.” Id. at 1426. By opening the
doorway in such a manner, Vaneaton’s arrest was valid because warrantless arrests carried
out in public places do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1427. The court went on
and concluded that Vaneaton’s case did not resemble the types of in-home invasions or
intrusions that Payton attempted to protect, and that “[k]nocking on a door to attempt to
contact a person inside is a common event and hardly a hallmark of a police state[][.]” Id.
59
See United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that when the
defendant opened his motel room door and came outside in response to a non-coercive
knock by police, he surrendered his heightened expectation of privacy and the Fourth
Amendment protections that go along with it including the right not to be detained based
on reasonable suspicion); Honeycutt v. Gillespie, 1998 WL 391470, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the warrantless arrest of defendant, made after she opened her doorway
without first checking who was behind the door, was reasonable because the doorway of a
house is a public place for Fourth Amendment purposes and the defendant had thus
voluntarily exposed herself to whoever was standing behind the door); United States v.
Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that although the police entry into
defendant’s motel room to perform a search violated the defendant’s privacy interest, the
police could and should have arrested the defendant at the threshold of the doorway);
United States v. Camacho, 1996 WL 419700, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
defendant’s warrantless arrest was permissible because by opening the door to his room,
the defendant had exposed himself in a public area); Fredericks v. Wright, 1995 WL 23651,
at *2 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that it is not a Fourth Amendment violation for government
officers to knock on an individual’s door and arrest the individual when the door is
opened, even if the individual is still standing in the doorway); United States v. Walsh,
1993 WL 326382, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the defendant, who was standing in
the doorway of a warehouse in plain view as police officers approached to arrest her, was
sufficiently in a public place that her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that individuals who
voluntarily look over their backyard fence or gate and expose themselves to public view of
anyone on the street cannot be said to be in an area where they have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and because defendant engaged in such actions his warrantless
arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Von Marschner, 1988 WL
65553, at *2 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that because the police did not surround the
defendant’s residence, confront him with weapons drawn, or order him to emerge from the
home, but instead invited him outside after knocking on his door, the defendant’s arrest
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he could not have reasonably believed that
he was arrested while still inside his home); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a doorway is a public place and thus no warrant was required
when DEA agents knocked on defendant’s door and immediately arrested him when he
opened the door); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
because the door to defendant’s apartment was opened in response to a police officer’s
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McKinnon v. Carr

Likewise, in McKinnon, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the validity of a warrantless open doorway arrest that occurred after
police, armed with probable cause, came to the defendant’s home,
knocked on the door and identified themselves, and the defendant
voluntarily opened his door.60 In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals strongly relied on the principles of Santana to establish that the
defendant McKinnon had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the
time of his arrest.61 The court explained that although McKinnon
attempted to rely on Payton to argue that the arrest violated his Fourth
Amendment right to privacy, the facts at hand made McKinnon’s case
clearly distinguishable because McKinnon was arrested at the doorway
of his home after voluntarily exposing himself to arresting officers (while
the defendants in Payton were arrested beyond the threshold of the
doorway after remaining firmly inside their homes).62
2.

Major Decisions Invalidating Warrantless Doorway Arrests

While this Note has shown that the circuit courts have, in many
instances, upheld warrantless doorway arrests, the circuit courts have
also invalidated these types of arrests in certain situations. Sparing v.
Village of Olympia Fields63 and United States v. Morgan64 are two important
knock and he was placed under arrest at that time, the issue of a warrantless entry into the
apartment was not before the court).
60
McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996). In McKinnon, the officers had
probable cause to arrest McKinnon based on evidence that he raped a woman. Id. The
officers did not threaten McKinnon with violence and asked McKinnon to identify himself,
which he did. Id. One of the officers told McKinnon that he was under arrest for rape, and
McKinnon was then allowed to dress himself before the arrest was actually made. Id. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because the defendant was standing within the
threshold of the doorway in an area open to public view, his warrantless arrest was valid
under the Fourth Amendment because he could no longer claim a valid expectation of
privacy at that time.
61
Id. The court explained that as in Santana, McKinnon “was visible, standing in the
threshold of his doorway, open to public view. He was in a place sufficiently public that he
had no legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. The court emphasized the fact that
McKinnon had voluntarily opened the door and acknowledged the authority of the officers
by asking them if he could dress before the arrest was effected. Id. at 936. See also supra
note 36 (explaining that because the defendant Santana was knowingly standing in the
doorway of her home, a public place, she was therefore not in an area in which she had any
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
62
McKinnon, 103 F.3d at 936. The court stated that “Payton contains language that
describes the Fourth Amendment as drawing a firm line at the entrance to one’s house, but,
on its facts, it has no application to a doorway arrest made in the circumstances of the
present case.” Id.
63
Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2001).
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cases in which the Sixth and Seventh Circuits concluded that warrantless
doorway arrests constitute violations of the Fourth Amendment, and
these cases are discussed in turn.
a.

Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields

In Sparing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
defendant’s warrantless arrest was invalid because the arresting officer
walked directly into Defendant Sparing’s home to make the arrest
without first obtaining Sparing’s consent.65 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the circumstances of the arrest in Sparing were
distinguishable from both Santana66 and a previous decision rendered by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Berkowitz.67 In
United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984).
Sparing, 266 F.3d at 690–91. In Sparing, the defendant was involved in a workplace
extortion scheme with one of his co-workers. Id. at 685. Sparing and his co-worker had
filed a police report alleging that another co-worker had stolen files from the office and
forged two checks. Id. After the police were alerted to the existence of the scheme, an
officer went to Sparing’s house and knocked on his door. Id. at 687. Sparing opened the
door and stood in the doorway, but was still standing behind his closed screen door when
the officer advised Sparing that he was under arrest. Id. Sparing asked the officer if he had
a warrant, and after the officer relayed that he did not, Sparing walked away from the
doorway and further into his home. Id. The officer then opened the screen door, entered
Sparing’s residence, and took several steps into the home to arrest him. Id. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that because the defendant’s arrest was not
made at the doorway or the threshold of the doorway but instead was conducted after the
police non-consensually walked into his home after opening a closed screen door, the arrest
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy. Id. at 690–91.
66
Id. at 689. The court explained that a Santana-type analysis would apply in situations
where “the individual is not voluntarily standing in an open doorway, but answers a knock
at the door, standing by a ‘fraction of an inch’ behind an open doorway[][.]” Id. Although
Sparing had answered a knock at his doorway, he was still behind a closed screen door at
the time of his arrest. Id. at 689–90. This vital fact led the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
to determine that that a Santana analysis would not apply in Sparing’s case. Id.
67
United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991). In Berkowitz, the defendant,
for whom probable cause existed to make an arrest, was told that he was under arrest as
soon as he opened the door to the police. Id. at 1380. The defendant then acquiesced to the
authority of the officers, and the officers entered his home to complete the arrest. Id. The
court held that when a person submits to an arrest at his doorway, he “has forfeited the
privacy of his home to a certain extent.” Id. at 1387. The court explained that “[a] person
who has submitted to the police’s authority and stands waiting for the police to take him
away can hardly complain when the police enter his home briefly to complete the arrest.”
Id. The Sparing court noted that in accordance with Berkowitz, “when an individual
voluntarily stands behind an open doorway—fractions of an inch ‘inside the home’—
ordinarily, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, she stands outside, in a public place.”
Sparing, 266 F.3d at 689. However, the Sparing court then clarified that its ultimate holding
in Berkowitz was as follows:
[I]f the police go to an individual’s home without a warrant, knock on
the door, announce from outside the home that the individual is
64
65
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declining to uphold Sparing’s arrest, the court reasoned that the facts of
the case put the decision beyond the scope of Santana, Berkowitz, and
Watson.68 The court explained that because Sparing was standing behind
a closed screen door at his doorway, he was not yet in a public place and
thus did not “surrender [any] reasonable expectations of privacy in [his]
home[.]”69 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated in
Sparing, the circuit courts are reluctant to uphold the validity of
warrantless doorway arrests in situations where police make an explicit
entry past the threshold of the doorway and walk into the private
confines of a home to carry out an arrest.70 The Sixth Circuit Court of
under arrest when she opens the door to answer, and the individual
acquiesces to a slight entry to complete the arrest, [then] the entry is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and consistent with Payton.
Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
68
Id. at 689. The most critical fact here, according to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, was that Sparing’s arrest was not conducted at the doorway or even at the
threshold of the doorway; Sparing stood inside his home behind his closed screen door,
and the officer opened this door and walked into Sparing’s home in order to arrest him. Id.
at 690–91. Therefore, Sparing was not in a public place as the defendant in Watson was,
was not voluntarily within an open doorway as in Santana, and was not answering a knock
at the door while standing fractions of an inch behind an open doorway as the defendant in
Berkowitz was. Id. at 690. Because Sparing clearly stood behind his screen door and
remained inside his home, he did not surrender any reasonable expectation of privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
69
Id. at 690. The court reasoned that unlike the situation in Santana, Sparing “was not
exposed to ‘public view, speech, hearing, and touch’ as if he were standing outside, in a
public place (voluntarily or otherwise).” Id. Therefore, because the police had not obtained
a warrant for Sparing’s arrest, the Court decided to apply the principles of Payton and held
that Sparing had not surrendered any reasonable expectation or privacy because he had
remained within his home. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded by
indicating that Sparing’s arrest could have been legally performed only if Sparing had
“opened his screen door, and [either] stepped [slightly] outside of his home or acquiesced
to a slight entry to complete the arrest.” Id.
70
See United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that
although the defendant put his arm and hand outside his house by extending them
through a panel opening after the police knocked on his door, the rest of his body did not
cross the threshold of the doorway and his doorway was not open to public view; thus the
officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering through the doorway and into
the defendant’s living room to effectuate the arrest); Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1286
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that because the defendant was attempting to limit his exposure to
police officers by closing an open door and defendant was at least a door’s width inside his
house when he attempted to close the door, the police violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by pushing the door open and taking two steps into the house to arrest the
defendant); United States v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the
defendant’s arrest, which occurred after the police crossed the threshold of and walked
directly into his open garage, violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy
because the garage is considered to be a private area of the home); LaLonde v. County of
Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that because defendant’s arrest
occurred after the police crossed the threshold of the doorway and walked into the
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Appeals rendered a similar decision in United States v. Morgan, which is
discussed next.
b.

United States v. Morgan

In Morgan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
defendant’s warrantless arrest at the doorway of his home violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because the police officers employed coercive
tactics which essentially forced the defendant to emerge from his home.71
Relying partly on the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Johnson,72 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
that Morgan did not voluntarily expose himself to a warrantless arrest
by appearing at the doorway.73 The court reasoned that although there
had not been a direct entry into Morgan’s home by police prior to the
defendant’s apartment, the case did not fall under the doorway exception and was a
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); Garrison v. City of
Cushing, 1993 WL 332284, at *3 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that because the defendant was
standing four to five feet within his house behind a closed screen door, he was not in a
public realm and therefore the subsequent police entry into the home to arrest the
defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807,
809–10 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because DEA agents entered a private warehouse,
climbed a flight of stairs to an office area, and opened a private office without knocking,
the subsequent warrantless arrest of the defendant while she stood inside the office area
violated her Fourth Amendment right to privacy).
71
United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984). In Morgan, the police
received a complaint that the defendant Morgan and several others had been target
shooting with automatic weapons inside of a public park. Id. at 1160. An officer responded
to the complaint and advised the group of men to leave the park. Id. After Morgan and the
others left in Morgan’s car, an unidentified observer approached the officer and alerted
him to the fact that the men were armed with automatic weapons and should be
considered dangerous. Id. A group of officers located Morgan’s car and followed it to the
home of his mother. Id. At this point, a squad of police officers surrounded the Morgan
home. Id. at 1161. The officers then flooded the house with spotlights and summoned
Morgan from the home with the blaring call of a bullhorn. Id. Morgan came to the front
door of the home with a pistol in his hand, and was subsequently arrested after the police
ordered him to put down the gun and come outside. Id.
72
626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980). In Johnson, the suspect’s warrantless open doorway arrest
was held invalid because the arresting officers used coercive tactics and misrepresented
their identities in order to force the suspect to open his door. Id. at 757. The Johnson court
explained that it could not be said that Johnson “voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless
arrest by opening his door to agents who misrepresented their identities[]” because
Johnson’s exposure was not consensual on his part. Id.
73
Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166. The court explained that it was an undisputed fact that
“Morgan was peacefully residing in his mother’s home until he was aroused by the police
activities occurring outside.” Id. The court emphasized that Morgan came to the doorway
“only because of the coercive police behavior taking place outside of the house.” Id.
Therefore, the important consideration in this case was the “location of the arrested person,
and not the arresting agent[]” in determining whether the arrest occurred within the
privacy of the home. Id.
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arrest, the coercive tactics used by police resulted in a “constructive
entry [which] accomplished the same thing[][.]”74 Therefore, the court
concluded that upholding Morgan’s arrest would undermine the
protections emphasized in Payton.75 As the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals indicated in Morgan, the circuit courts are reluctant to uphold
warrantless doorway arrests in situations where police use coercive
tactics to either gain entry to a home or force a defendant to come to the
doorway, because in those situations a defendant’s exposure at the
doorway is not voluntary.76 With the aforementioned principles in
mind, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish v.
Nugent will now be discussed.

Id. The court explained that the coercive tactics used by the police to force Morgan
out of the home rose to the level of what could be considered an actual entry into the
privacy of the home to conduct the arrest. Id. In a subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals clarified that a ‘“constructive entry’ [was] when the police, while not
entering the house, deploy overbearing tactics that essentially force the individual out of
the home.” United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2005). The Thomas court
also explained that “coercive police conduct [refers to] ‘such a show of authority that [the]
Defendant reasonably believe[s] he ha[s] no choice but to comply[]” with the requests of
police. Id. (citing United States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2001)).
75
Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166. The court explained that the warrantless arrest of Morgan,
who stood in the doorway of a private home not out of his own free will but instead in
response to coercive police conduct, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.; see also
United States v. Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house that may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances).
76
See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
although the defendant eventually emerged from his apartment after the police turned off
the electrical power to his residence, set off a flash-bang device, threw tear gas into his
apartment, and set off a bullhorn to summon him, he had clearly succumbed to police
coercion in doing so and his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment); Hadley v.
Williams, 368 F.3d 747, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that because police used fraud and
coercive tactics in order to gain entry into the home to arrest the defendant, such an arrest
left the issue of whether the defendant actually consented to the entry to be determined by
the trier of fact); Saari, 272 F.3d at 809 (holding that because the officers summoned the
defendant from the home with their weapons drawn and pointed at him after knocking on
the door, they “acted with such a show of authority that [the] Defendant reasonably
believed he had no choice but to comply[]”; therefore, the warrantless arrest violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights) (footnote omitted); United States v. Al-Azzawy,
784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that because the defendant was inside his trailer
at the time he was surrounded by armed officers and because the defendant did not
voluntarily expose himself to their view outside his trailer, the fact that he emerged under
circumstances of extreme coercion amounted to a constructive entry and violated
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); see also Tracy Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from
the Backseat of a Police Squad Car, 70 BOSTON U. L. REV. 543, 578 at n.117 (1990) (arguing that
“[c]oercive police behavior outside a home which results in the removal or arrest of a
legitimate occupant violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment just as actual entry to accomplish
the same result does[]”).
74
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C. McClish v. Nugent and the Circuit Split on Warrantless Open Doorway
Arrests
In McClish, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
defendant’s warrantless open doorway arrest was a violation of his
Fourth Amendment right of privacy and was contrary to the principles
established in Payton.77 In support of its decision, the court relied heavily
on the actual location of the defendant at the time of arrest, finding that
McClish remained firmly inside his trailer home at the time of arrest
despite the fact that he stood near the doorway.78 The court gave no
weight to the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the door to the police
officers before the arrest was made.79 Indeed, the court declined to apply
a Santana analysis80 to the facts of the case and instead held that
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007). In McClish, the police
received complaints that defendant McClish had been harassing his neighbors in a trailer
park. Id. at 1233. Upon investigating the incident and observing McClish’s behavior, the
responding officer concluded that he had probable cause to arrest McClish for aggravated
stalking. Id. at 1234. A group of police officers returned to the trailer park that night and
sought to effectuate a warrantless arrest on McClish. Id. at 1235. The officers drove
through an electronic gate in front of McClish’s trailer and proceeded to the front door of
the home. Id. The officers knocked on the door and McClish went to the door and
voluntarily opened it. Id. at 1235–36. Then, one of the officers reached into the house
through the open door, grabbed McClish as he stood near the doorway, and pulled him out
onto the trailer’s porch to carry out the arrest. Id. See also supra note 44 (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance of the house that may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant).
78
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1245 (stressing that because McClish lived in a trailer, which does
not have all of the amenities of a larger house such as a “definable chamber between the
outer door and the interior of the dwelling[,]” McClish was already firmly planted within
the privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the officers and stood
behind the door); see also United States v. Quaempts, 411 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that because the defendant lived in a trailer so small that he was able to open his
door to police while remaining in his bed, the defendant was not in a public place and did
not abandon his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
79
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247. The court explained that while “[i]t is surely true that an
individual who opens the door to his home may provide an officer with a basis for finding
probable cause[;] . . . this is quite distinct from creating, all in itself, a right of entry to seize a
person from his home without a warrant.” Id. The court emphasized that “McClish did
not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when he
opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within his home from a
warrantless arrest.” Id. (citing United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that “a person does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the
officers’ entry by [partially opening the door to determine the identity of officers knocking
on the door], and that his arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the
[F]ourth [A]mendment”)).
80
See supra note 36 (explaining that in Santana, because the defendant was knowingly
standing in the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an
area in which she could claim a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment).
77
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McClish’s arrest involved a warrantless intrusion into the home that was
held unconstitutional in Payton.81
Judge Anderson filed a special concurring opinion in McClish in
which he agreed with the majority in aspects of the case not relevant to
the scope of this Note, but strongly dissented from the majority’s holding
that McClish’s arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.82 Judge
Anderson argued that Santana, rather than Payton, should have been
applied as controlling precedent because Payton was not decided as a
doorway arrest case.83 In addition, Judge Anderson reasoned that by
choosing to apply the dicta in Payton84 rather than the holding of
Santana,85 the majority opinion was, in essence, arguing that Payton
overruled Santana.86 Judge Anderson argued that this fact alone was
enough to reject the majority’s reasoning in McClish.87

McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247–48. The court explained that because “warrantless
intrusions beyond the ‘zone of privacy’ delimited by the threshold are presumptively
unreasonable[,]” the fact that the arresting officer “reached across the threshold of the
home and grabbed McClish without warning[]” is what caused the arrest to violate
McClish’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1247–48 & n.16; see supra note 44 (holding that
the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house and absent
exigent circumstances, the threshold of the doorway may not reasonably be crossed to
make an arrest unless a warrant has first been obtained).
82
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1253.
83
Id. at 1253–54. The concurring opinion reasoned that McClish’s case was “legally
indistinguishable from Santana[]” based on the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the
door in response to a knock by police, and thus “[k]nowingly expose[d] both himself and
the immediate area behind his threshold to public view.” Id. Therefore, McClish could no
longer claim an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment once he opened his
door, and the police needed only probable cause rather than a warrant to arrest him. Id. at
1254. The concurrence then explained that Payton, as applied here by the majority, “was
not a doorway arrest case[]” but rather had decided the narrow issue of “simply ‘whether
and under what circumstances an officer may enter [into the interior of] a suspect’s home
to make a warrantless arrest.’” Id.
84
Id. at 1255 (explaining that in Payton, the Court said nothing about the
constitutionality of arrests occurring at an open doorway and did not determine any type
of rule to apply in such scenarios; the Payton decision simply used the term threshold to
generally refer to the entrance to the home).
85
See supra note 33 (upholding Santana’s warrantless arrest because she had knowingly
exposed herself to police officers in the doorway of her home—which is a public place).
86
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1255–56. The concurrence explained that such a conclusion
would be unwarranted because the Court “does not overrule precedents sub silentio[]” and
in the Payton decision itself, “the Court actually cited Santana, without overruling or even
questioning it[]” in a string cite of public arrest cases. Id. at 1256.
87
Id. at 1256 n.5 (explaining that because the Court in Santana said that arrests on the
threshold without a warrant are legal and “common sense tells us that an officer
conducting an arrest at the literal threshold would necessarily cross the plane of the door in
a great many threshold arrests[,]” the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with Santana’s
holding).
81
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III. ANALYSIS
Although the circuit courts have upheld warrantless doorway arrests
under certain circumstances and invalidated them in others, these
decisions, aside from McClish, are ultimately consistent with existing
Supreme Court precedent.88 Part III.A analyzes decisions by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals in which warrantless doorway arrests have been
upheld, explains the factors that these courts have found to be important
in analyzing the validity of open doorway arrests, and argues that these
decisions are consistent with Supreme Court precedent established by
Santana, Payton, and earlier cases.89 Then, Part III.B analyzes decisions by
Circuit Courts of Appeals in which warrantless doorway arrests have
been invalidated and argues that these cases also represent a consistent
application of either Santana or Payton as dictated by the circumstances
of the particular case.90 Finally, Part III.C analyzes the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish and argues that it was not
only incorrect, but that it abandoned existing precedent on the issue of
warrantless doorway arrests and was based upon flawed reasoning by
the majority.91
A. Key Factors of Decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals Upholding
Warrantless Doorway Arrests
In upholding warrantless doorway arrests, the circuit courts have
emphasized two important points: (1) warrantless arrests can be
lawfully conducted at the threshold of the doorway because it is a public
place, and (2) once an individual opens the doorway of his home, that
individual surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.92 The key aspect of all these judicial decisions is
that those circuit courts which have upheld the validity of warrantless
open doorway arrests have been able to properly distinguish the
Supreme Court’s holding in Santana from its holding in Payton.93
See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (examining decisions by Circuit Courts of Appeals involving
warrantless doorway arrests).
89
See infra Part III.A.
90
See infra Part III.B; see also supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle); supra note
44 (discussing the Payton principle).
91
See infra Part III.C.
92
See infra Parts III.A.1–2.
93
See supra note 36 (holding that because the defendant Santana was knowingly
standing in the doorway of her home which is considered a public place, she was not in an
area in which she could claim any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment); supra note 44 (holding that the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at
the entrance of the home which cannot reasonably be crossed without a warrant if exigent
circumstances do not exist).
88
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The Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply to Arrests Made at the
Doorway’s Threshold

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Santana, which has
never been overruled, the doorway of a home is considered to be a
public place.94 Although Payton stands for the principle that the Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the home that may not
be crossed absent a warrant or other exigent circumstances, the circuit
courts have determined that arrests conducted at the doorway do not
violate Payton.95 In such cases, police or other law enforcement officers
do not cross the threshold of the doorway and make an actual entry into
the privacy of the home to make the arrest; rather, the arrests are
conducted after the defendants expose themselves to police officers by
standing in the public area of the doorway.96

See supra note 36 (explaining that a doorway is a public place and that by exposing
herself in such an area, the defendant Santana could lawfully be subjected to warrantless
arrest). See also 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 97 (2007) (noting that the doorway of the home is
considered to be a public place for purposes of warrantless arrest).
95
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). For a discussion of cases in which
warrantless doorway arrests have been upheld as valid, see supra notes 55 and 59 and
accompanying text. See also United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386 (7th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that courts have generally upheld arrests “where the police go to a person’s
home without a warrant, knock on the door, announce from outside the home the person is
under arrest when he opens the door to answer, and the person acquiesces to the arrest[]”).
96
See Honeycutt v. Gillespie, 1998 WL 391470, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
defendant was arrested in the doorway of her home which is a public place); United States
v. Camacho, 1996 WL 419700, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the defendant opened
the doorway of his hotel room to police officers and was subsequently arrested after doing
so); United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that as the
defendant Vaneaton stood at the doorway, the police advised Vaneaton that he was under
arrest and did not enter past the threshold of the doorway before fully effecting the arrest);
Fredericks v. Wright, 1995 WL 23651, at *2 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that according to
statements made by the defendant, the arresting officer did not step into the home to arrest
the defendant but rather informed the defendant that he was under arrest and asked the
defendant to step outside); Pulliam v. City of Hornlake, Mississippi, 1994 WL 442316, at *2
(5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the defendant had placed herself at the doorway in response
to the officers knock, and therefore was arrested in a public place); United States v. Walsh,
1993 WL 326382, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the defendant was standing in the
doorway of a warehouse in plain view as the officers approached to arrest him); United
States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that as the defendant
opened the door, the police drew their weapons, ordered the defendant to raise his hands,
and placed him under arrest); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that as the defendant answered the door, he was immediately placed under
arrest and handcuffed); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating
that the door was opened by the defendant in response to an officer’s knock, and the
defendant was placed under arrest at the time; the officers were therefore not required to
enter the apartment to place the defendant under arrest).
94
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When an individual stands or exposes himself or herself within the
doorway, he or she is no longer located within the privacy of the home
and can, consistent with precedent set forth in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Santana, be subjected to a valid warrantless arrest under the
Fourth Amendment.97 Significantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Payton has absolutely no application in these circumstances; when an
arrest occurs at the doorway, the issue of a warrantless entry into the
home does not actually arise.98
The issue surrounding warrantless doorway arrests is more aptly
based upon forming a precise definition of what constitutes the
threshold of the doorway. No Court of Appeals has set forth such a
definition, nor has any decision by the Court of Appeals precisely
defined the exact location in which a defendant must be standing at the
time of the warrantless arrest for the arrest to be valid.99 Because of this
ambiguity, law enforcement officers are faced with difficult choices that
are further complicated by the McClish decision when they attempt to
make a warrantless arrest.100 However, as discussed in Part II.A.2, the
circuit courts have identified another factor—the defendant’s voluntary
exposure to arresting officers—which allows for a more determinative
method of analysis through Fourth Amendment principles.101

See supra note 33 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that a person who opens the door to a dwelling in response to a
knock by an invitee opens to view whatever can be seen by a nosy neighbor or an
observant police officer and such a person exhibits no actual expectation of privacy after
doing so); LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258 (noting that “[p]ermitting the police to make a
warrantless arrest of a person who answers the door . . . makes great sense simply because
it can be expected that in the vast majority of such confrontations the person will submit to
the police[]”).
98
See supra note 41 (explaining that a warrantless arrest made within the privacy of the
home constitutes an unlawful invasion of an individual’s right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment). See also Gori, 230 F.3d at 51 (explaining that Payton does not hold or suggest
that the home is a sanctuary from reasonable police investigation; rather, Payton protects an
individual’s privacy interest, even within the home, only in terms of what the individual
has not knowingly exposed to public view) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S 38, 42
(1976)).
99
See supra Part II.B.
100
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a warrantless
open doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into the private confines of the home which
violates the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton).
101
See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the circuit courts have held that once an
individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual surrenders his reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
97
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An Individual Surrenders His Reasonable Expectation of Privacy by
Voluntarily Opening the Door of the Home

In analyzing an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under
the Fourth Amendment, it is important to keep in mind that the Fourth
Amendment protects people rather than places.102 Furthermore, in the
context of warrantless doorway arrests, the protections offered by the
Fourth Amendment do not apply to what an individual knowingly
exposes to the public.103 The circuit courts, in addition to relying on
Santana’s holding that a doorway is a public place, have emphasized that
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is an important factor
that must be evaluated in determining the validity of a warrantless
doorway arrest.104
For example, in Vaneaton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically stated that the main issue in the case was not whether the
defendant was standing inside or outside the threshold of the doorway
at the time of arrest, but whether the defendant “had voluntary exposed
himself to warrantless arrest by freely opening the door of his motel
room to police.”105 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals based
its decision to uphold the defendant’s warrantless arrest in McKinnon on
the fact that the defendant, by voluntarily opening the door of his home
to police and standing at the doorway, “had no legitimate expectation of
privacy.”106 In United States v. Gori, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest in similar
circumstances and even went so far as to suggest that “[n]o one in a
place open[] to public view can expect privacy in that place and at that
time, whether [he] is on the threshold [of the doorway], in a vestibule [of
the home,] or at the far end of an exposed interior room.”107

See supra note 24 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places).
See supra note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection[]”).
104
See infra notes 105–07 and accompanying text (discussing principles supporting the
validity of warrantless doorway arrests in Vaneaton, McKinnon, and Gori); see also supra note
36 (explaining the Santana principle).
105
See supra note 57 (explaining that if the defendant Vaneaton had voluntarily exposed
himself to the police by opening the door of his motel room, the presumption of Payton
would be overcome).
106
McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1996). The court explained that based
on Santana, McKinnon’s warrantless doorway arrest was valid under the Fourth
Amendment because he had voluntarily opened the door and exposed himself to public
view. Id.
107
United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000). The court also noted that once an
individual voluntarily opens the door of his home to whoever is standing outside, that
102
103
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The circuit courts have continually placed less emphasis on the
precise location of the defendant in the doorway during the course of
arrest and have instead relied more heavily on the individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the arrest.108 This
analysis of doorway arrests correctly implicates the right of privacy that
the Fourth Amendment protects, namely that of the individual
himself.109 Therefore, by remaining within his home and not answering
the door, an individual in this type of situation fully retains his
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment because
the principles of Santana and Payton have not yet been implicated.110
Because the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, it
is not until an individual decides to open the doorway of the home to
police, and expose himself to public view, that the Fourth Amendment is
relevant to the analysis.111 At this point the individual has knowingly
abrogated his reasonable expectation of privacy and can be subjected to a
lawful warrantless arrest.112 It is important to note that the individuals
arrested in these types of situations are not merely individuals who
simply come to the doorway and open the door to police standing
outside; the principles governing warrantless doorway arrests apply

individual “exhibit[s] no actual expectation of privacy and therefore lose[s] the heightened
constitutional protection that might flow from such an expectation.” Id.
108
See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (arguing that an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy is the determinative factor that must be analyzed in a warrantless doorway
arrest case); see also supra note 55 (explaining that because the defendant in Pulliam
voluntarily opened the doorway to police, his arrest would have been valid even if his feet
were planted slightly back from the door frame); supra note 50 (explaining that the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Duncan that the crucial issue in warrantless doorway
arrest cases “involve[s] the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and whether that
individual came to the doorway voluntarily[]”); supra note 67 (noting that in Berkowitz, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that an individual who voluntarily opens the door
and stands there waiting for the police to arrest him cannot complain if the police briefly
enter the home to complete the arrest).
109
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that the protections
offered by the Fourth Amendment have been held to apply to people rather than places);
Lewis, supra note 24 (arguing that the protection of privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is aimed at the protection of the individual rather than the home).
110
See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle); supra note 44 (explaining the
Payton principle).
111
See supra note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection[]”).
112
See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle); see also LAFAVE, supra note 27, at
384 (arguing that the home is generally held to be an area in which an individual can
maintain an expectation of “privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited[]”).
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only to individuals for whom probable cause exists to make a felony
arrest.113
B. Consistent Application of the Principles of Santana and Payton
The circuit courts decline to uphold warrantless doorway arrests in
two types of situations. The first situation occurs when police or other
law enforcement officers make an actual, explicit entry past the threshold
of the doorway and walk into the home to make the arrest.114 The
second situation occurs when police or other law enforcement officers
make a constructive entry into the home or employ coercive tactics to
force an individual to come to the doorway of the home for purposes of
arrest.115 Cases involving actual police entry into the home or coercive
police tactics designed to force an individual to the doorway simply
cannot stand under the rules set forth in both Santana and Payton because
these situations constitute violations of the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.116
1.

Rejecting the Validity of Doorway Arrests That Involve Actual Entry
into the Home Is Consistent With Payton

Payton stands for the principle that a warrantless entry past the
threshold of the doorway and into the privacy of the home to make an
arrest is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.117 Although the circuit
courts have sometimes declined to uphold what at first glance might
seem like a warrantless doorway arrest, a closer examination of the facts
of such cases shows these arrests merely implicated the doorway; in
these situations, the arrests were actually conducted within the privacy
of the home and were properly invalidated consistent with Payton.118

113
See supra note 29 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests
in public places where a police officer has probable cause to believe a felony has occurred).
114
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a (surveying cases in which warrantless doorway
arrests were held to violate the Fourth Amendment because the police clearly entered past
the threshold of the doorway and into the home to conduct the arrest).
115
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b (surveying cases in which warrantless doorway
arrests were held to violate the Fourth Amendment because police employed coercive
tactics which forced the defendants to expose themselves in the threshold of the doorway
for purposes of arrest); see also United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1166 (6th Cir. 1984)
(defining a constructive entry as a situation where police, while not entering the home,
deploy overbearing tactics that essentially force an individual out of the home in violation
of the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
116
See infra Parts III.B.1–2.
117
See supra note 44 (explaining the Payton principle).
118
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
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For example, in Sparing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated the defendant’s arrest because although the arrest involved
the doorway, it had not actually been conducted at the doorway or even
at the threshold of the doorway.119 Instead, while the defendant stood
inside his home behind a fully closed screen door, an officer opened this
door and walked directly into the home in order to arrest the
defendant.120 Similarly, in LaLonde v. County of Riverside, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that because police walked through the
threshold of the doorway and into the defendant’s apartment in order to
make the arrest, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy
was violated.121 In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to uphold the defendant’s warrantless arrest in Garrison v. City of Cushing
because the defendant was standing four to five feet within his house
behind a closed screen door, and the police entered well beyond the
threshold of the doorway to carry out the arrest.122
These cases did not involve open doorway arrests; rather, they
involved law enforcement officers actually entering into the private
confines of an individual’s home absent consent—something that is
clearly forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.123 The circuit courts that
have addressed “actual entry” cases note the existence of a common but
vital principle that is crucial to the analysis of open doorway arrests: the
zone of privacy that Payton sought to protect lies beyond the threshold of

119
Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
because the defendant’s arrest was not made at the doorway or the threshold of the
doorway but instead was conducted after the police non-consensually walked into his
home, the arrest violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); see also
supra note 65 (discussing Sparing).
120
Id. at 690–91 (explaining that Defendant Sparing stood inside his home behind a fully
closed screen door, and the arresting officer opened the door and walked directly into
Sparing’s home in order to arrest him). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
here, because Sparing stood behind his closed screen door and thus did not surrender any
reasonable expectation of privacy, the arresting officer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by opening the screen door and walking into the home to arrest Sparing. Id. at 690.
121
See supra note 70 (holding that because the defendant’s arrest in LaLonde occurred after
the police crossed the threshold of the doorway and walked into the defendant’s
apartment, the case did not fall under the doorway exception and was a violation of the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy).
122
See supra note 70 (holding that because the defendant in Garrison was standing four to
five feet within his house behind a closed screen door, he was not in a public area;
therefore, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the subsequent police entry into
his home for purposes of arrest).
123
See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting that the circuit courts have invalidated warrantless
doorway arrests that occurred after arresting officers walked into the home to make the
arrest, because each defendant, by remaining within the confines of his home, did not
surrender his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/9

Rados: Open Doorway Arrests: Has McClish v. Nugent Truly Changed the Ana

2009]

Open Doorway Arrests

843

the doorway and can seemingly only be breached when an arresting
officer places his entire person within the home to make the arrest.124
2.

Rejecting the Validity of Doorway Arrests Involving Coercive Police
Tactics Is Consistent With Santana

The Santana decision clearly states that the threshold of the doorway
is a public place, and an individual who knowingly exposes himself to
public view in such an area may be subjected to warrantless arrest.125
Although circuit courts have invalidated warrantless arrests made while
the defendant was standing in the threshold of the doorway, decisions in
these types of cases have been based upon a finding that the defendant’s
exposure to the public was not truly voluntary.126
For example, in Morgan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest because the
defendant came to the doorway “only because of the coercive police
behavior taking place outside of the house.”127 Similarly, in United States
v. Saari, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again invalidated the
defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest, holding that the coercive
activities of police officers outside of the defendant’s home amounted to
a constructive entry and in-home arrest.128 Finally, in Fisher v. City of San
Jose, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to uphold the
defendant’s warrantless arrest because the defendant was subjected to

124
See supra note 70 (surveying various circuit court decisions in which the defendants’
warrantless arrests were invalidated due to actual entries into the home by arresting
officers). If these decisions are examined carefully, each defendant’s warrantless arrest was
invalidated because the arresting officer physically placed his entire person past the
threshold of the doorway and within the home or residence to make the arrest. See, e.g.,
Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1286 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding the defendant’s warrantless
arrest invalid because the police pushed the defendant’s door open and took two steps into
the house to arrest the defendant).
125
See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle).
126
See infra text accompanying notes 127–29 (citing cases in which the circuit courts have
invalidated warrantless doorway arrests because the coercive tactics employed by arresting
officers forced the defendant to expose himself at the doorway of the home).
127
See supra note 74 (holding that the coercive tactics employed by the police in Morgan to
force the defendant out of the home, involving the use of floodlights and a bullhorn,
amounted to a “constructive entry” because the defendant’s exposure to the officers was
involuntary).
128
See supra note 76 (holding that because the officers in Saari summoned the defendant
from his home with their weapons drawn and pointed at him after knocking on the door,
they “acted with such a show of authority that [the] Defendant reasonably believed he had
no choice but to comply[]”; therefore, the defendant’s warrantless arrest violated his Fourth
Amendment rights).
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police coercion while still inside his home and emerged at the doorway
only because of the tactics employed by the police.129
Although the defendants in each of these cases came to the doorway
after police announced their presence at the home, the arrests were
correctly deemed invalid under the Fourth Amendment because the
exposure to public view by the defendants was not voluntary.130 Instead,
the coercion employed by police officers made each defendant believe he
had no choice but to surrender to the officers by appearing at the
threshold of the doorway or actually emerging from the home.131
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Santana, these types of
warrantless arrests were properly invalidated. Specifically, in cases
involving police coercion, the defendant has not voluntarily exposed
himself to public view and therefore maintains a reasonable expectation
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.132
3.

Different Facts Surrounding an Arrest Does Not Mean a New
Standard Has Been Created

This Note argues that the circuit courts have found that Santana and
Payton are able to co-exist because they apply to entirely different types
of arrests.133 Additionally, although this Note urges that a circuit split on
the issue of warrantless doorway arrests did not truly exist until the
See supra note 76 (holding that although the defendant in Fisher eventually emerged
from his apartment after the police turned off the electrical power to his residence, set off a
“‘flash-bang’” device, threw CS gas into his apartment, and set off a bullhorn to summon
him, he had clearly succumbed to the police coercion in doing so and his warrantless arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment).
130
See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text; see also LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 260
(explaining that if the defendant’s warrantless arrest at the door was brought about by
coercive tactics employed by arresting officers, “then the warrantless arrest there is quite
properly characterized as illegal[]”).
131
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1984). (explaining that
the officers had flooded the defendant’s house with spotlights and summoned the
defendant Morgan from the home with the blaring call of a bullhorn); Saari, 272 F.2d at
806–07 (explaining that the arresting officers surrounded the doorway of the defendant’s
apartment with their weapons drawn and ordered him to emerge); Fisher v. City of San
Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the arresting officers turned off
the power to the defendant’s apartment, set off a “‘flash-bang’” device, threw CS gas into
his apartment, and set off a bullhorn in an attempt to force the defendant to emerge from
his apartment).
132
See supra note 33 (holding that Defendant Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid
under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant knowingly exposed herself to police
officers in the doorway of her home, which is a public place); see also supra note 35
(explaining that the Court held in Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection[]”).
133
See supra Parts III.A–B.
129
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McClish decision, other authors have contended that the circuit courts
have applied Payton differently in certain situations and that two major
views have emerged regarding warrantless doorway arrests.134 Both of
these arguments, however, fail to recognize that: (1) Payton does not
truly apply to the doorway arrest scenario, and (2) circuit court decisions
in which warrantless arrests have been invalidated involved the
existence of either non-consensual entries into the home or coercive
police tactics surrounding the arrest.135
The suggestion that the circuit courts have interpreted the
requirements of Payton differently is flawed and based only on a
confused interpretation of judicial decisions involving warrantless
doorway arrests.136 Payton has no implication whatsoever in the
doorway arrest scenario; Payton merely held that arrests carried out
within the home, absent consent or acquiescence to the authority of the
arresting officers, violate the Fourth Amendment.137 Ultimately, if the
circuit court decisions are read carefully, the cases in which Payton has
been applied to invalidate warrantless arrests have involved factual
distinctions that put the cases beyond the simple doorway arrest
scenario resolved by Santana because actual entries into the privacy of
the home were made.138 The simple fact that certain decisions have
invalidated arrests due to actual entries into the home and certain
decisions have upheld arrests due to the voluntary exposure of the
defendant at the threshold of the doorway does not implicate a circuit
split, and it is incorrect to suggest that such a circuit split occurred before
the McClish decision.139
134
Marino, supra note 11, at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have interpreted and
applied the requirements of Payton differently which has led to a circuit split on the issue of
warrantless open doorway arrests); Citron, supra note 11, at 2786 (contending that two
conflicting views have been adopted by the circuits in an attempt to resolve the dispute
over the constitutionality of warrantless open doorway arrests).
135
See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that the circuit courts have consistently applied Payton
to invalidate warrantless arrests that implicated the doorway of the home but involved
actual, non-consensual entry into the home to make the arrests); supra Part III.B.2 (arguing
that the circuit courts have consistently applied Santana to invalidate warrantless arrests in
which the defendant exposed himself in the threshold of the doorway, but such exposure
was not voluntary on the part of the defendant).
136
Marino, supra note 11, at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have interpreted the
requirements of Payton differently leading to a circuit split on the issue of warrantless open
doorway arrests).
137
See supra note 44 (explaining the Payton principle).
138
See supra note 70 for cases in which the circuits have invalidated warrantless arrests
because they occurred after the arresting officers made a non-consensual entry into the
home. See supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle).
139
See supra Part III.B (arguing that Payton has been consistently applied by the circuit
courts to invalidate warrantless arrests involving non-consensual entry into the privacy of
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Next, case law does not adequately support the suggestion that the
circuits are in dispute over arrests conducted at the threshold of the
doorway.140 While the circuits have adopted two different views to
resolve such cases involving arrests conducted at the threshold of the
doorway, each view is merely, at its core, a proper application of either
Payton or Santana as the facts and circumstances of each case dictate.141
No disagreement actually exists among the circuits because Santana and
Payton apply to entirely different scenarios of warrantless arrest and
their principles are not at odds.
Santana is the sole Supreme Court decision that governs doorway
arrests and is applied to uphold such an arrest only if the defendant’s
exposure to police is voluntary and the arrest occurs in the threshold of
the doorway.142 Payton has no bearing upon the doorway arrest scenario
and operates to invalidate a warrantless arrest that takes place when
arresting officers make a full entry beyond the threshold of the doorway
and into the privacy of the home absent consent or other exigent
circumstances.143 The confusion on this issue stems from the fact that in
any “actual entry” scenario of warrantless arrest governed by Payton
(where the arrest occurs inside the home), the doorway is necessarily
implicated in the course of the arrest, even when the arrest takes place well
beyond the doorway and within the privacy of the home.

the home). But see Marino, supra note 11 at 579–87 (arguing that the circuit courts have
interpreted and applied the principles of Payton differently which has caused a circuit split
on the issue of warrantless open doorway arrests).
140
Citron, supra note 11, at 2786 (contending that the circuits are in dispute over deciding
cases involving warrantless doorway arrests and two conflicting views, referred to as the
“voluntary exposure view[]” and “sanctity view,” have been adopted by the circuits in an
attempt to resolve such cases).
141
Id. at 2786 (explaining that the “voluntary exposure view” refers to the position that
plain view seizures at the threshold of the doorway do not constitute Fourth Amendment
violations because the threshold of the doorway is a public place, and an individual in a
public place cannot claim any legitimate expectation of privacy); id. at 2796 (explaining that
the “sanctity view[]” refers to the position that a person who opens his door in response to
the knock of a police officer does not surrender his privacy interest such that an officer may
conduct a plain view seizure at the threshold).
142
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Santana decision); supra note 36 (explaining the
Santana principle).
143
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Payton decision); supra note 44 (explaining the
Payton principle).
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C. The Decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in McClish v.
Nugent Abandoned Both Existing United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals Precedent
In McClish, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to uphold
a warrantless doorway arrest.144 This decision was inconsistent with the
principles set forth in Santana, Payton, and other circuit cases addressing
this issue.145 Because an actual entry into the home was not made and no
coercive tactics were used by police to force the defendant to open his
door, Part III.C.1 explains why McClish was incorrectly decided and the
defendant’s warrantless arrest should have been upheld as valid under
Santana and other cases decided by the Courts of Appeals.
1.

The Eleventh Circuit Disregards Both the Public Place and Voluntary
Exposure Principles of Santana

In declining to uphold defendant McClish’s warrantless doorway
arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the principles
explained in Santana governing such arrests.146 First, the court refused to
recognize that the threshold of the doorway is a public place and an area
in which a warrantless arrest is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.147 In McClish, the defendant voluntarily opened his door in
response to a knock from the arresting officers and the record supports a
finding that the defendant remained within the general area of the
doorway after he opened the door.148 However, merely because McClish
144
See supra note 100 (holding that a warrantless open doorway arrest is a prohibited
entry into the private confines of the home which violates the Fourth Amendment and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Payton).
145
See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in McClish disregards the pubic place and voluntary exposure principles that
formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding warrantless open doorway
arrests in Santana); supra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in McClish misinterprets the protections emphasized in Payton, namely
that Payton only protects an individual’s right of privacy in terms of what he or she has not
knowingly exposed to public view).
146
See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle).
147
See supra note 78 (explaining the manner in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted the facts surrounding the warrantless arrest of the Defendant McClish
and arguing that McClish was standing within the privacy of his home at the time of his
arrest).
148
See id. at 1235. The facts, taken most favorably to the defendant, state that McClish
“went to the door, and opened it[]” after he heard a knock from the police. Id. The
arresting officer “was standing on the porch, directly in front of the open door,” and he
“reached into the house, [and] grabbed [McClish][.]” Id. at 1235–36. It would therefore
seem logical that McClish, by opening the door, must have been within the general vicinity
of the doorway at this time.
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lived in a trailer, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
acknowledge that McClish was actually standing in the threshold of the
doorway.149
Even though McClish averred that he had been standing completely
inside his home at the time of his arrest, the idea that one could open a
door and not be near the threshold of the doorway simply defies logic.150
In spite of this, based on an erroneous finding that no threshold of the
doorway apparently existed in McClish’s trailer, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals invalidated McClish’s arrest on the grounds that
McClish had not been in a public place at the time of the warrantless
arrest.151 Such reasoning is clearly contrary to Santana because it
completely disregards the Supreme Court’s holding that the threshold of
the doorway is considered a public area for purposes of arrest under the
Fourth Amendment.152 The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals also draws an arbitrary distinction between trailer homes and
other types of residences for purposes of warrantless doorway arrest.
Apparently, a clearly delineated threshold of the doorway is only
present in certain types (or sizes) of dwellings.153 However, courts are
not architects, and it should not be the task of a court to determine
Id. at 1245. The court emphasized the fact that because McClish lived in a trailer,
which does not have all “the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber
between the outer door and the interior of the dwelling[][,]” McClish was already “firmly
planted” within the privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the
officers and stood behind the door. Id. Based upon this reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals impliedly held that a definable threshold of the doorway does not exist
based on the mere fact that the defendant McClish lived in a trailer. This erroneous finding
allowed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to reason that because no threshold existed
in McClish’s trailer, he had actually been “standing firmly inside the living room of his
home” at the time of his arrest. Id. Thus, by simply opening the door and standing in the
doorway, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an individual actually
remains in the living room and privacy of his trailer rather than in the public area of the
doorway’s threshold. Id.
150
Id. at 1236. The facts indicate that “McClish unambiguously stated that [he] had been
standing completely inside the home at the time[]” of his arrest. Id. The author of this
Note contends that it would not be possible for a person to be able to fully open a door and
still remain within the privacy of his home. By opening the door, a person would
necessarily have to be within the area of the doorway or he would not be able to grab hold
of the doorknob and pull the door open.
151
Id. at 1248 (holding that a warrantless open doorway arrest is a prohibited entry into
the private confines of the home which violates the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Payton).
152
See supra note 33 (holding that the defendant Santana’s warrantless arrest was valid
because she knowingly exposed herself to police officers in the doorway of her home,
which is a public place).
153
McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (stressing that the Defendant
McClish’s trailer did not have “a definable chamber between the outer door and the
interior of the dwelling[]”); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
149
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precisely whether a threshold can be found to exist in a particular type of
residence.154
More importantly, the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals gives no weight to the fact that McClish had voluntarily opened
the door to police, which was the key factor the Supreme Court had relied
on in upholding the validity of the defendant’s arrest in Santana.155 The
police did not use coercive tactics to force McClish to open his door and
no constructive entry was made; McClish simply heard a knock at the
door and opened it.156 By invalidating McClish’s warrantless open
doorway arrest, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not merely
ignore the principles of Santana that it should have applied to uphold the
arrest; it went directly against those principles and blatantly
misconstrued decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals to support its
erroneous holding.157 Furthermore, the court engaged in a lengthy
See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 257. LaFave argues that the idea that a suspect cannot be
subjected to a warrantless arrest while standing at the threshold of the doorway is unsound
because “it means that whether a particular warrantless arrest turns out to be lawful . . .
often depend[s] upon nothing more than whether the arresting officer had the prescience to
testify that the defendant was ‘in’ the doorway rather than ‘at’ it, or ‘on’ the threshold
rather than ‘by’ it.” Id. LaFave also notes that “even if courts could be expected to sort out
the ‘in’-‘at’ and ‘on’-‘by’ distinctions on a regular basis, one cannot help but wonder why
that burden should be imposed upon them.” Id.
155
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247 (emphasizing that “McClish did not completely surrender or
forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when he opened the door, including, most
notably, the right to be secure within his home from a warrantless arrest[]”). But see supra
note 35 (noting that because Santana had knowingly exposed herself to the public in the
doorway of her home, she no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment). See also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1256 n.5 (Anderson, J., concurring)
(explaining that because the Court in Santana said that arrests on the threshold of the
doorway without a warrant are legal and “common sense tells us that an officer conducting
an arrest at the literal threshold [of the doorway] would necessarily cross the plane of the
door in a great many threshold arrests[][,]” the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with
Santana); supra note 36 (explaining the Santana principle).
156
Id. at 1235 n.7 (explaining that an affidavit had stated that McClish simply opened the
door following the knock of police, while McClish had stated at a deposition that he asked
who was at the door and opened it after the police announced their presence).
157
Id. at 1248. In reasoning that McClish had not surrendered his reasonable expectation
of privacy by voluntarily opening his door to police, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on United States v. McCraw, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held “that a
person does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to the officers’ entry by
[partially] [opening the door] [to determine the identity of officers knocking on the door], and [the
defendant’s] arrest inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the [F]ourth
[A]mendment and . . . Payton.” Id. at 1247 (citing United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224,
228 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)). However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
blatantly misconstrued the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by
explaining that McCraw simply held that “a person does not surrender his expectation of
privacy nor consent to the officers’ entry by [opening the door,] and [the defendant’s] arrest
inside his room under such circumstances is contrary to the [f]ourth [a]mendment and . . .
154
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discussion attempting to determine McClish’s precise location in the
doorway even though the circuit courts have consistently determined
that this factor has little bearing on the validity of the arrest if the
individual has already surrendered his reasonable expectation of
privacy.158
Because it disregards the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
linked to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the decision
of the Eleventh Circuit in McClish represents a confused analysis of the
issues at stake in warrantless doorway arrest cases.159 The facts of
McClish make it apparent that the decision simply called for an
application of the principles of Santana because an individual who
knowingly stands in the doorway is no longer in an area where he can
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy.160 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, did not see it that way.
2.

The McClish Decision Misinterprets the Protections That Payton
Actually Emphasized

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also errantly justified its
decision to invalidate McClish’s warrantless arrest by emphasizing that
Payton.” McClish, 483 F.3d at 1247 (citing McCraw, 920 F.2d at 228) (emphasis added). The
facts of McCraw clearly indicate that the defendant did not fully open his door to arresting
officers as McClish had done. See McCraw, 920 F.2d at 226 (explaining that the defendant
heard a knock at the door, opened the door “about halfway while standing inside his
room[][,]” and then “attempted to close the door[]” when he saw the arresting officers).
But see McClish, 483 F.3d at 1235 (stating that McClish himself “averred that [the arresting
officer] was standing on the porch, directly in front of the open door,” after McClish had
opened it). Because McClish had fully opened his door to arresting officers and made no
attempt to close the door when he saw them at his doorway, any reliance on McCraw by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is not only unpersuasive but simply incorrect.
158
See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing various cases in which the circuit courts have held
that the arrested individual’s precise location in the doorway is not the dispositive issue to
be examined in warrantless doorway arrest cases); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1263–64
(Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that the issue at stake in McClish and similar cases is
not the specific location of the arrested individual in the doorway, but whether the
arresting officers violated the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy in making the
arrest).
159
See supra Part III.A (arguing that the circuit courts have found the important issues in
warrantless doorway arrest cases to be: (1) the threshold of the doorway is a public place
and therefore an area in which a valid warrantless arrest can be made, and (2) once an
individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual surrenders his reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
160
See supra note 36 (discussing the Santana principle); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1253–
54 (Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that McClish’s case was “legally indistinguishable
from Santana[]” based on the fact that McClish voluntarily opened the door in response to a
knock by police, and thus ‘“knowingly expose[d]’ both himself and the immediate area
behind his threshold to public view[]”).
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police made an actual entry into McClish’s trailer.161 The facts of McClish
indicate that no such entry was made, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals was able to conclude only that an actual entry occurred because
it refused to recognize that a clearly delineated threshold of the doorway
exists within a trailer home.162 Furthermore, even though the arresting
officer in McClish reached into the open doorway to grab hold of the
defendant and complete the arrest, these actions did not rise to the types
of in-home entries and invasions of privacy that Payton serves to
protect.163
This principle is clear because the circuit courts have interpreted the
zone of privacy sought to be protected by Payton to extend beyond the
threshold of the doorway itself by continuously holding that the
threshold can be breached only when an arresting officer physically
places his entire person within the home.164 It is apparent that after
Id. at 1235–36. The court explained that after McClish voluntarily opened the door to
the police, one of the officers reached into the house through the open door, grabbed
McClish as he stood in the doorway, and pulled him out onto the trailer’s porch to effect
the arrest. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that this amounted to an actual
entry into the home which violated the principles of Payton. Id. at 1248.
162
Id. at 1245 (stressing the fact that because McClish lived in a trailer, which does not
have “all of the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber between the outer
door and the interior of the dwelling[][,]” McClish was already “firmly planted” within the
privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to the officers and stood behind
the door).
163
See supra note 41 (explaining the Supreme Court in Payton held that a warrantless
arrest inside the home, absent exigent circumstances such as consent, is an unlawful
invasion of an individual’s right to privacy that cannot be allowed even when probable
cause exists); supra note 98 (explaining that Payton does not hold or suggest that the home
is a sanctuary from reasonable police investigation; rather, Payton protects an individual’s
privacy interest, even within the home, only in terms of what the individual has not
knowingly exposed to public view); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1254 (Anderson, J., concurring)
(explaining that Payton, unlike Santana, “was not a doorway arrest case[]” but decided only
the narrow issue of when and under what circumstances an officer may enter the interior of
a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest); see also LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 257
(suggesting that based upon Payton, if a warrantless arrest at the doorway can be
accomplished without entry into the home, then “it should be deemed lawful
notwithstanding the absence of a warrant, even if the arrestee was just inside rather than on
the threshold at that time[]”).
164
See supra note 70 (discussing cases in which courts have deemed warrantless doorway
arrests invalid because the arresting officers explicitly walked past the threshold of the
doorway and into the privacy of the home to make the arrests); see also Sparing v. Village of
Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that because the defendant’s
arrest was not made at the doorway or threshold of the doorway but was actually
conducted after the police walked into his home without his consent, the arrest violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1254 (Anderson, J.,
concurring) (stressing that in Payton, the arresting officers penetrated well into the interior
of the defendant’s home by doing more than simply reaching through an open door as the
arresting officers had done in McClish).
161
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probable cause exists for an individual’s arrest and he has voluntarily
opened his doorway to police, the arresting officer does not violate
Payton by simply reaching into an open doorway and grabbing hold of
the individual.165 In this situation, the arresting officer’s entire person
has by no means intruded past the threshold of the doorway, and the
rule of Payton has no authoritative bearing upon the validity of the
arrest.166 In the end, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals improperly
relied on the principles of Payton and distorted the facts of the case to
uphold the defendant’s warrantless doorway arrest in McClish.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
This Note argues that circuit courts have consistently applied
Supreme Court precedent to resolve warrantless doorway arrest cases
and the conflict among the circuits on this issue did not arise until the
McClish decision.167 McClish was improperly decided, and the confused
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals could lead to further
misapplication of the principles of Santana and Payton.168 However, a
more explicitly defined standard will help properly resolve future cases
dealing with warrantless doorway arrests. This suggested model
See supra note 35 (explaining that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection); see also
McClish, 483 F.3d at 1257 (Anderson, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]he Santana rule is
consistent with Payton’s privacy-protection rationale[]” because “Santana simply says that
when a suspect has voluntarily relinquished the privacy of the home in the doorway area,
the Payton concern for the privacy of the home is not present and the public arrest rule of
Watson applies[]”); LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258 (suggesting that if the arrestee, after
opening the door to arresting officers, does not retreat from the door and “the police officer
merely reaches in [the home] to manifest the fact of arrest, such a de minimis breaking of
the vertical plane above the threshold should not itself make the warrantless arrest
unlawful[]”); supra note 33 (holding that the doorway of a home is a public place, and that
a warrantless arrest made at the doorway after a defendant has voluntarily exposed herself
to public view is valid under the Fourth Amendment).
166
See supra note 44 (stating the Payton principle); see also McClish, 483 F.3d at 1257
(Anderson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that if a suspect chooses to open the door to
arresting officers, “the officers do not offend the rationale of Payton by simply reaching in
and grabbing him[][;]” the rule of Santana allows police to seize a suspect who is standing
“within reach of the officer standing at the threshold [of the doorway] because the officer
does not thereby intrude further on the suspect’s privacy than what the suspect had
voluntarily relinquished[]” by opening the door).
167
See supra Parts III.A–B (arguing that the circuit courts have consistently applied
Supreme Court precedent to resolve warrantless doorway arrest cases and that the Santana
and Payton decisions can easily co-exist because they speak to entirely different scenarios of
warrantless arrest).
168
See supra Part III.C (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in McClish abandoned existing precedent on the issue of warrantless doorway arrests and
was based upon flawed reasoning by the majority).
165
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approach, taking aspects from the Santana and Payton decisions as well
as from other cases discussed in this Note decided by the Courts of
Appeals, will curtail virtually any ambiguities surrounding these arrests
through a firm and easy-to-apply standard.
Part IV.A proposes a standard of model judicial reasoning that
should be applied to cases dealing with warrantless doorway arrests and
emphasizes that the voluntary exposure of the defendant to arresting
officers should be the sole determinative factor in resolving these types
of cases.169 Then, Part IV.B addresses how the model standard addresses
the use of coercive police activity in warrantless doorway arrest cases
and explains why the precise location of the defendant in the doorway at
the time of his arrest should have absolutely no bearing on its validity.170
A. The Proposed Model Standard
Based on the historical protections emphasized by the Fourth
Amendment, Supreme Court precedent, and decisions by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals regarding warrantless doorway arrests, the validity of
a warrantless doorway arrest should hinge solely upon the following
determination: whether the arrested individual surrendered his reasonable
expectation of privacy by opening his door and voluntarily exposing his person
to police officers standing outside.171 If the arrested individual has opened
the door to his dwelling in any way and surrendered his reasonable
expectation of privacy by voluntarily exposing his person to police
officers standing outside, this model approach operates to uphold all
instances of warrantless arrest regardless of the precise location of the
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Parts IV.B.1–2.
171
In order for a warrantless doorway arrest to be upheld under the voluntary exposure
test, the suspect himself must, in almost all cases, be the individual that opens the door to
the arresting officers. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Payton, if another
individual within the home opens the door and the suspect can be seen inside the home but
does not come to the door, a warrantless arrest cannot be carried out because the suspect
himself did not voluntarily expose himself to the arresting officers in the doorway. See
supra notes 40–44 (explaining that in Riddick, the companion case to Payton, the defendant’s
warrantless arrest was invalidated based upon principles of actual entry after the
defendant’s son opened the door to arresting officers, the officers saw the defendant in bed
covered by a sheet through the open doorway, and the officers subsequently entered the
home and arrested him). The sole exception to this scenario is laid out by LaFave in his
Fourth Amendment treatise: in a situation where the arresting officer knocks on the door,
another occupant of the home answers the door, the occupant is told of the officer’s
intention to arrest the defendant who is inside the home, the occupant informs the
defendant of the officer’s intention, and the defendant still comes to the door to meet the
arresting officer, his arrest would be valid under the Fourth Amendment and standard of
model reasoning proposed in this Note. See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 259 (emphasis
added).
169
170
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individual in the doorway at the time of the arrest or the manner in
which the door was opened.172 Warrantless arrests have historically
been deemed to implicate “‘right of privacy’” issues rather than arbitrary
precise location issues, and this model approach emphasizes the former,
rather than the latter, factor as determinative.173
Although this model approach proposes a controversial standard of
analysis, its focus on principles of voluntary exposure flows directly
from the Fourth Amendment’s emphasis on protecting each individual’s
right to a reasonable expectation of privacy.174 This protection is not
absolute, however, and can easily be surrendered because it applies to
individuals rather than specific places.175 In other words, the reasonable
expectation of privacy does not protect an individual simply because his
body remains in a certain place, like a home; it protects such an
individual if he has not taken an action that is inconsistent with
maintaining the privacy of his person, like exposing himself to public
view by voluntarily opening a door.
It is clearly reasonable for an individual to maintain an expectation
of privacy if he remains within his home and does not respond to a
knock at his door, no matter who might be outside. By not opening the
door, the individual has acted in a manner consistent with maintaining

172
The model standard draws no distinction between situations in which the individual
partially opens the door to see who is outside, quickly opens and closes the door after he
sees the arresting officers, or fully opens the door with blatant disregard for whoever
stands outside because in all of these instances, the individual has engaged in behavior
inconsistent with a desire for the privacy of his person to remain undisturbed. See supra
note 35 (explaining that the Supreme Court held in Katz that what a person knowingly
exposes to public view, even within his own home, is not subject to the protections offered
by the Fourth Amendment).
173
See supra note 109 (explaining that historically, the protections of privacy embodied by
the Fourth Amendment have been held to apply to people rather than places, and hence
protect the individual himself rather than his home).
174
See supra note 27 (explaining that each individual has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and stating that the Court
in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends upon
whether the individual who claims such protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded area); see also Lewis, supra note 24 (explaining that the protection of privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is aimed at the protection of
the individual); Jones, supra note 27 (stating that the concept of “reasonable expectation of
privacy” is the starting point for Fourth Amendment analysis).
175
See supra note 24 (explaining that the Court held in Katz that the Fourth Amendment
protects people rather than places); see also supra note 17 (citing the text of the Fourth
Amendment). It should be noted that because the Fourth Amendment itself refers to
protecting a “right” of people to remain secure from unreasonable seizures in their persons
and homes, the use of the word “right” indicates that the privacy interest can be forfeited.
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his right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.176 However, by freely
opening the door to police standing outside, the individual can no longer
maintain a right of privacy.177
B. Other Important Aspects Addressed by the Proposed Model Standard
In order for the model standard proposed in this Note to have any
practical implications, courts addressing the validity of these types of
arrests must look more closely at the circumstances surrounding each
arrest. Courts must place a much heavier emphasis on determining
whether arresting officers used coercive tactics to force the defendant to
appear at his doorway because only in such instances would a
defendant’s exposure be involuntary.178 No emphasis, however, needs to
be placed on the defendant’s precise location in the doorway at the time
of his arrest because such issues are truly extraneous to the warrantless
doorway arrest scenario.179
1.

Coercive Police Activity Taking Place at the Time of the Arrest

A key factor that must play a role in determining the validity of an
arrest under the voluntary exposure analysis is the presence of coercive
police activity at the time of the arrest. If an individual is forced to
expose himself to police maintaining a presence outside of his home
based on the belief that he must submit to their authority, the individual
has not surrendered his reasonable expectation of privacy because his
exposure to the police was not voluntary.180
However, because
voluntary exposure operates as the defining principle in this model
approach, a more specific definition of “coercive police conduct” must be
set forth to ensure that the arrested individual truly opened the door to
police out of his own free will.181
See LAFAVE, supra note 50, at 258–59 (explaining that if in a particular case in which no
exigent circumstances exist and the intended arrestee does not answer the door but instead
“elects to exercise the security of the premises by not submitting to the arrest, then it is
hardly unfair that the police should be required to withdraw and return another time with
a warrant[]”).
177
See supra note 35 (holding that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own house or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection).
178
See infra Part IV.B.1.
179
See infra Part IV.B.2.
180
See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing warrantless doorway arrests involving coercive
tactics by police and arguing that in these types of situations, the exposure of the defendant
to police is not truly voluntary).
181
See supra note 74 (explaining that “coercive police conduct” refers to such a show of
authority that the defendant reasonably believes that he has no choice but to comply with
the requests of police).
176
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In this model approach, “coercive activity” by arresting officers
includes behavior identified in circuit court decisions examined earlier in
this Note182 as well as misrepresentation of the identities of the officers to
the suspect, verbal threats made by the officers to the suspect,
maintaining a continued, visible police presence outside of the residence
until the suspect opens his door, and similar attempts at coercion and
deception. The focus underlying whether behavior of police qualifies as
coercive activity centers around whether the suspect reasonably believed
that he had no reasonable choice but to open his door and expose himself
to arresting officers.
2.

The Precise Location of the Defendant at the Time of the Arrest

Based on this model approach, if courts faced with determining the
constitutionality of warrantless doorway arrests base their analysis on
principles of voluntary exposure, they must ignore the precise location of
the defendant at the time of the arrest. One would have to be somewhat
near the doorway to be able to successfully open a door anyway, and
factoring the location of the defendant into the analysis only serves to
create ambiguities and obscure line-drawing scenarios for courts. It
would be virtually impossible to create a workable standard to define
the precise area of the threshold of the doorway in different types of
residences, and using this type of standard would inevitably lead to
conflicts as to whether the defendant was actually in the doorway, a step
back from the doorway, or somehow “firmly planted inside” the home
after opening the door at the time of the arrest.183
By ignoring the location of the defendant at the time of the arrest, it
will be easier for courts to distinguish doorway arrests from in-home
arrests based solely on the voluntary exposure principle. Because the
facts of warrantless doorway arrest cases will never be identical, it does
not make sense to base the analysis on an arbitrary factor such as the
actual location of the defendant which will invariably differ on a case-bycase basis. Hence, the most logical working standard revolves around
See supra note 131 (discussing examples of police coercion, such as flooding the
defendant’s house with spotlights and summoning the defendant from the home with the
blaring call of a bullhorn, surrounding the doorway of the defendant’s residence and
ordering him to emerge with weapons drawn, turning off the power to the defendant’s
residence, setting off a “‘flash-bang’” device at the defendant’s residence, and throwing
tear gas into a defendant’s residence).
183
See supra note 78 (explaining that because the defendant McClish’s residence did not
have “the amenities of a larger house, such as a definable chamber between the outer door
and the interior of the dwelling[,]” McClish was already “firmly planted” within the
privacy of his home when he voluntarily opened his door to police and stood behind the
door).
182
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the suggested model approach of voluntary exposure. Not only does the
model approach find an appropriate basis in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because it protects the rights of individuals rather than
particular locations, the model approach is also conducive to analysis in
almost every type of situation due to its clear and simple standards.184
V. CONCLUSION
Flash back to John Smith’s warrantless arrest at his apartment. After
Smith opens the door, the officers advise him that he is under arrest and
one of the officers grabs Smith’s arm to handcuff him and carry out the
arrest. Under the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
McClish, the police would be violating Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights
by arresting him even though he voluntarily opened his door to the
officers and stood at the doorway. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals would preoccupy itself with determining the precise location of
Smith at the time of his arrest and would reason that although Smith
opened the door to the arresting officers, he was still within the privacy
of his home at that time. Applying the model reasoning suggested in
this Note, however, Smith’s arrest would be upheld regardless of
whether he stood at, near, on, or slightly behind the threshold of the
doorway. Because Smith voluntarily opened his door to the arresting
officers who maintained a brief, non-coercive presence outside of his
apartment and did not enter past the threshold and into Smith’s
apartment to make the arrest, the officers did not violate Smith’s right of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
This Note has clarified that warrantless open doorway arrests are
constitutionally valid and ultimately consistent with Fourth Amendment
principles and Supreme Court precedent. In line with the existing
standards set forth in both the Santana and Payton decisions, these types
of arrests should only be found invalid in two instances: (1) if arresting
officers enter beyond the threshold and into the privacy of the home to
make the arrest absent consent from the suspect, and (2) if arresting
officers employ coercive tactics that force the suspect to involuntarily
expose himself at the doorway.
Although it may seem that prior to McClish, decisions by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals dealing with warrantless doorway arrests were based
on an unclear standard, this is simply untrue. The principles of Santana

See supra note 24 (explaining the Katz Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects
people rather than places); see also Lewis, supra note 24 (explaining that the protection of
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes; it is aimed at the
protection of the individual).
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and Payton are distinct and have been consistently applied by the circuit
courts either to uphold or invalidate warrantless arrests regardless of
whether the courts expressly relied on these principles.185 Although the
McClish decision resulted in a circuit split on the constitutionality of
warrantless doorway arrests, it was incorrectly decided by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. Because the arrest at issue in McClish did not
implicate the protections emphasized in Payton, the arrest should have
been upheld consistent with the principles in Santana.186
This Note has ultimately maintained the view that McClish is a
unique and improperly reasoned decision on the issue of warrantless
open doorway arrests. Courts faced with resolving cases dealing with
these types of arrests must be cautious not to rely on the reasoning set
forth by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals because it would be
irrational to expect judges to apply an arbitrary standard of analysis that
defies precedent established by both the Supreme Court and the Circuit
Courts of Appeals. Instead, to ensure consistency among the circuits,
courts that address the constitutionality of warrantless doorway arrests
should either apply the distinct principles of Santana and Payton, or
apply a more explicitly defined standard such as the model standard
proposed in this Note.
Christopher J. Rados∗

See supra Part III.A (explaining that the circuit courts have upheld warrantless
doorway arrest cases based on the Supreme Court’s holding that the threshold of the
doorway is a public place and therefore an area in which a valid warrantless arrest can be
made, and that once an individual opens the doorway to his home, that individual
surrenders his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); supra Part
III.B (arguing that although the circuit courts have declined to uphold warrantless doorway
arrests in certain cases, the decisions have been consistent with Santana and Payton because
the cases involved either the use of coercive police tactics to force the defendant to
involuntarily come to the doorway, or actual entry by arresting officers past the threshold
of the doorway and into the privacy of the home to make the arrest).
186
See supra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in McClish disregards both the public place and voluntary exposure principles that
formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision regarding warrantless open doorway
arrests in Santana); supra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the McClish decision misinterprets the
protections that had originally been emphasized in Payton).
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